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Viewpoint
It’s Time to End Single-Family Zoning
Michael Manville Paavo Monkkonen Michael Lens
ABSTRACT
Local planning in the United States is unique in the amount of land it reserves for detached single-family
homes. This privileging of single-family homes, normally called R1 zoning, exacerbates inequality and
undermines efficiency. R1’s origins are unpleasant: Stained by explicitly classist and implicitly racist
motivations, R1 today continues to promote exclusion. It makes it harder for people to access high-
opportunity places, and in expensive regions it contributes to shortages of housing, thereby benefiting
homeowners at the expense of renters and forcing many housing consumers to spend more on housing.
Stacked against these drawbacks, moreover, are a series of only weak arguments in R1’s favor about pref-
erences, aesthetics, and a single-family way of life. We demonstrate that these pro-R1 concerns are either
specious, or can be addressed in ways less socially harmful than R1. Given the strong arguments against
R1 and the weak arguments for it, we contend planners should work to abolish R1 single-family zoning.
Keywords: inequality, regulation, single-family homes, zoning
Most American cities have a zoning designa-tion prohibiting all development exceptdetached single-family homes. Many citiesapply this designation to most of their land.
We think this designation, usually called R1, should not
exist. R1 is inequitable, inefficient, and environmentally
unsustainable. It lets a small number of people amass
disproportionate property wealth, excludes many others
from high-opportunity neighborhoods, and forces
others to pay more for housing than they should (Lens
& Monkkonen, 2016; Reeves, 2017).
In many cities, R1 prevents housing development
where development would be most beneficial and
instead pushes development—and conflict over it—
into denser, lower income neighborhoods, onto pol-
luted commercial corridors, and into the undeveloped
land outside city boundaries. R1 was born from, and
codifies, base and tribal instincts: a desire to set privi-
leged in-groups apart and keep feared or despised out-
groups at bay (Nightingale, 2012). Its history is explicitly
classist and deeply interwoven with racism, and its pre-
sent form only barely conceals these origins (Rothstein,
2017; Trounstine, 2018; Weiss, 1987). It should have no
future. Planners should actively work to end it.
We do not expect this argument to go down easily.
So before proceeding we should clarify what we are
and are not saying. We are not saying that ending R1
is the only—or even the most important—possible
planning reform. Nor do we suggest that ending R1 will
by itself solve the problems of segregation, exclusion, or
housing affordability. Ending R1 is, like many reforms,
necessary but not sufficient. R1 stands out for being
both important and overlooked. Many reforms are pro-
posed, debated, and (too often) defeated. R1, however,
remains a third rail. Ending it is rarely on the table, but it
should be. In the 21st century, no city should have any
land where nothing can be built except a detached sin-
gle-family home.
Because R1 is, in many places, an unquestioned sta-
tus quo, we focus more on why planners should end it
and less on how. We have no illusion that the politics
will be simple or that every city can end R1 the same
way. R1 may disappear through incremental reform
rather than outright abolition. But the first step, no mat-
ter the subsequent path, is agreement that R1 should
end. That is the case we make here.
A final clarification: We are arguing against a type
of law, not a type of building. There is nothing intrinsic-
ally wrong with detached single-family homes. Two of
the three of us live in them, and we all grew up in
them. Living in a detached single-family home is a per-
fectly acceptable private choice, albeit one with real
social and environmental costs (Arnold, Graesch,
Ragazzini, & Ochs, 2012; Norman, MacLean, & Kennedy,
2006). But it is not a choice that warrants public protec-
tion. People in detached single-family homes neither
need nor deserve laws ensuring that nothing will sur-
round them but structures like their own.
The Case Against R1
Why do we oppose R1? Suppose that, for your well-
being, you need regular access to only a small amount
of expensive medicine. One day you go to the
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pharmacy and learn the government has implemented
a new rationing system strictly limiting the number of
sales that can occur in small doses. Because many peo-
ple, like you, only need small doses, the new rule results
in few small doses being available. Plenty of medicine is
available—you can see it over the counter—but the
pharmacist can only sell it in large quantities. So you are
stuck. If you want your medicine, you must buy more
than you need, at a price higher than you can afford.
This new rationing system is also strictly enforced. Not
only must you buy in large quantities, but you cannot
divide up your ration afterward and sell your extra doses
to others who might need and value them.
Most people, we suspect, would consider such a
rationing system unjust and inefficient. It would force a
large number of people to spend and consume more
than they otherwise would, subsidize the smaller num-
ber of people who want and can afford large doses,
and keep some people from getting medicine at all.
Fortunately, the United States does not allocate
medicine in this bizarre manner. But it does ration urban
land this way. And although land is not medicine,
access to land, like access to medicine, has powerful
implications for wellbeing. Where people live directly
affects their exposure to pollution and violence
(Chakraborty & Zandbergen, 2007; Peterson & Krivo,
2010), the quality of schools their children can attend
(Reardon & Owens, 2014), and the jobs they can reach
(Johnson, 2006). Residential location is thus strongly cor-
related with many life outcomes, from earnings to edu-
cational attainment to mental and physical health.
Location, moreover, has not just large but multigener-
ational returns, yielding better outcomes for people
who move in and their children as well (Chetty &
Hendren, 2018a, 2018b; Currie, 2011).
Because opportunity is unevenly distributed both
between and within metropolitan areas, and because
moving people to opportunities is generally easier than
moving opportunities to people, letting more people
live in the most prosperous and amenity-rich neighbor-
hoods of our urban areas would dramatically increase
wellbeing (Chetty & Hendren, 2018a, 2018b; Lens, 2017;
Sanbonmatsu et al., 2011; Sharkey, 2013). Many people,
however, are effectively barred from these cities and
neighborhoods because access to them is sold primarily
in large, expensive, and inefficient chunks—through R1.
Lower and middle-income families would benefit
immensely from a small foothold in prosperous neigh-
borhoods—perhaps a modest apartment or duplex—
but R1’s prevalence means few such small footholds are
available. The result is scarce housing in desirable pla-
ces. This scarcity, in turn, pushes prices beyond what
many can afford and burdens many others by forcing
them to buy more housing than they need. The conse-
quences are debt and stress as well as a growing
anxiety among many families that they are running in
place on the road to economic security (Frank, 2007;
Warren Tyagi & Warren, 2004).
Just how much urban land is zoned R1? Estimates
differ depending on one’s choice of denominator (all
land, residential land, land with or without road space,
etc.). But all are high, even in central cities. In San
Francisco (CA), home to some of the most valuable and
productive land on Earth, about 38% of residential land
is R1. In Los Angeles (CA) the proportion is more than
70%. Seattle’s (WA) estimated share is more than 80%,
and San Jose’s (CA) approaches 90%.1 In the prosperous
suburbs of urban areas, moreover, R1 approaches ubi-
quity (Hirt, 2014). The low-crime, high-job access,
high–test score communities that ring cities around
the United States are defined by their detached single-
family homes, which in many cases are virtually the only
housing zoning allows.
R1 arose, at least in part, from invidious motives. It
was built on arguments about the sort of people who
don’t live in detached single-family homes and the
harms that would arise if they mixed, socially or as fel-
low taxpayers, with those who do. R1 first proliferated
after the Supreme Court struck down racial zoning in
1917’s Buchanan v. Warley decision. Buchanan made
single-family mandates appealing because they
maintained racial segregation without racial language.
Forcing consumers to buy land in bulk made it
harder for lower income people, and therefore most
non-White people, to enter affluent places. R1 let prices
discriminate when laws could not (Trounstine, 2018;
Weiss, 1987).
Contemporary observers denounced this regime of
backdoor segregation, but in 1926 the Supreme Court
upheld it. In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. (1926),
the court tacitly excused R1’s implicit racism by validat-
ing its explicit classism.2 Cities could prohibit apart-
ments, the court said, because apartments were
nuisances: “mere parasites” on the value and character
of single-family homes. In Euclid’s wake, R1 became a
quiet weapon of the White and wealthy in their cam-
paign to live amid but not among the non-White and
poor (Danielson, 1976; Rothstein, 2017;
Trounstine, 2018).
Today’s planners cannot be blamed for R1’s origins;
however, the past throws a long shadow over the sys-
tem they now administer. R1 delivers large and undeni-
able benefits to some people who own property. In
places where housing demand is high, R1 inflates home
values and protects the physical character of neighbor-
hoods. But its social costs exceed these private benefits.
Higher property values for owners mean higher rents
for tenants. Because homeowners as a group are richer
and Whiter than renters, policies that increase housing
prices redistribute resources upward, increasing
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homeowner wealth, reducing renter real incomes, and
exacerbating racial wealth gaps.3 When cities prohibit
development in amenity-rich neighborhoods, further-
more, housing demand does not disappear. It moves to
other neighborhoods—where it may fuel gentrification
and displacement—and into the urban fringe, resulting
in longer commutes, greater emissions, and less
open space.
These factors combine to make R1 the sort of prob-
lem planning was designed to solve. R1 is a classic col-
lective action problem, an inefficiency that arises when
people pursuing their own ends generate an outcome
that harms the larger whole. It is also an affront to social
justice, an impediment to a more inclusive and inte-
grated society. Yet R1, with its dark past and present
harms, is not an institution planners are trying to end.
Instead it is an institution planners created, and one
they too often work to protect. Even bold zoning reform
usually steers clear of R1 (Monkkonen, 2019). Cities will
consider more height and density, but almost always in
places that are already tall and dense.
Planners and planning documents often talk about
R1 neighborhoods the way conservationists talk about
manatees. Zoning codes describe R1 in language that
combines normative approval of single-family living
with dark hints about looming threats (Hirt, 2014).
Zoning codes in both Detroit (MI) and Milwaukee (WI)
discuss “protecting” and “preserving” R1, after noting
R1 is characterized by “high ratios of homeownership”
and “suitable characteristics of family life” (Hirt, 2014,
p. 58). An explicit priority in Los Angeles’s General
Plan Framework Element is to “preserve single-family
neighborhoods by focusing any growth away from
them and into centers” (City of Los Angeles, n.d.). In
both 2018 and 2019, California’s legislature considered
laws that would supersede local zoning and allow
multifamily housing on all land near transit, including
R1 zones. Los Angeles’s mayor objected both times,
calling 2018’s law “too blunt for single family home
areas” (Dillon & Zahniser, 2018) and 2019’s law “a bad
stick” that would threaten neighborhood character
(Cowan, 2019). The cake was taken, however, in 2018,
when Seattle’s mayor bravely suggested ending R1 in
her city. The Seattle Times editorialized against her in
tones that would have done Euclid proud. “Seattle
must preserve its single family neighborhoods,” the
paper intoned, calling them the city’s “most precious
asset” and “essential to its livability, character and
economic success” (“Don’t Upzone Seattle
Neighborhoods,” 2018).
The Nonexistent Case for R1
What makes R1 so important? The arguments in its favor
are consistently weak. One common contention—made
by journalists, neighborhood groups, and some aca-
demics—is that most Americans prefer detached single-
family homes, and trying to change that preference is
impossible (Kotkin & Cox, 2019; Swanson, 2015). This
argument has two problems. First, it is not obvious that
R1 is always a majority preference. Certainly many peo-
ple live in R1 neighborhoods. But housing is a long-lived
good, and because single-family homes are often all
that zoning allows, the prevalence of single-family living
might be partly an artifact of constrained choice.
People’s preferences can influence zoning, but at least
some evidence suggests zoning can influence preferen-
ces (Levine, 2005).
Second and more important, our goal is to end a
mandate, not change a preference. R1 is not problem-
atic because it allows detached single-family homes. It
is problematic because it does not allow anything else.
In places where housing demand is low and everyone
wants a detached single-family home surrounded by
detached single-family homes, most structures will be
single-family homes, regardless of regulation. The zon-
ing in this case does not bind. Nonbinding zoning
imposes no costs but also delivers no benefits, so it is
not clear why we need it. In other places, however,
where housing is in high demand, R1 does bind:
Neighborhoods would not be uniformly single-family
without it. In these places R1 suppresses the supply and
diversity of housing and denies some people access to
the housing and opportunities they want. Put another
way, where R1 is harmless, it is also unnecessary. But
where it is necessary, it is also harmful. Both situations
argue for its abolition.
A second argument for R1 is aesthetic: R1 protects
against excessive density. This argument is most com-
mon among neighborhood groups and other incum-
bent residents (Dougherty, 2017). Anti-development
advocates in Los Angeles, for example, often decry the
“Manhattanization” (or, in one case, the “Dubai-ization”
[Dillon, 2018]) of the city’s neighborhoods. Certainly it
could be disconcerting to have a tower suddenly loom
over your single-family home. But this is an argument
against tall buildings, not for R1. Rejecting the
most restrictive zoning need not require embracing the
most permissive zoning. Cities can end R1 and allow
structures other than single-family homes—town-
houses, triplexes, and so on—without allowing
skyscrapers.
Removing R1, in fact, could reduce rather than
increase the prevalence of high-rise development. Tall
buildings are at least partly a response to the scarcity of
development-friendly parcels. When development can
occur on only a small share of land, more pressure exists
to build that land out intensively (and, as a conse-
quence, more expensively). In cities where most resi-
dential land is R1, legalizing mid-rise development in
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single-family neighborhoods could dramatically increase
the housing supply, at relatively low cost, with no high-
rise development at all.
Aesthetics, at any rate, are often in the eye of the
beholder. Certainly some people think detached single-
family homes are the highest expression of urban
design. But many others prefer the townhomes of
Philadelphia (PA), the duplexes of New Orleans (LA), or
the pleasant mix of building types that define Tokyo
(Japan) and Mexico City (Mexico). To the extent the
world has a consensus “beautiful” city, it might be Paris
(France), which has almost no detached single-family
homes (and, for that matter, almost no skyscrapers).
Aesthetics matter, but R1 prevents some buildings
many people consider attractive, does not prevent
detached single-family homes that are unattractive, and
most of all has high social costs unrelated to building
appearance. Locking people out of opportunity is a
high price to pay for consistency in lawns and gables.
The zoning language we quote above suggests
another argument for R1: Detached single-family neigh-
borhoods generate a special sort of social life (Hirt,
2014; McCabe, 2016). In this telling, which has echoes of
the Euclid decision, R1 is synonymous with the
American Dream, uniquely suitable for homeownership
and raising families. Set aside for a moment the ques-
tion of whether homeownership is something public
policy should promote (e.g., McCabe, 2016). The idea
that R1 neighborhoods are the only places families can
thrive is supported by virtually no theory or evidence: It
is a product mostly of rank classism. Every day, all over
the world, people successfully raise children in and
around townhomes, condos, and apartment buildings.
Planning language that singles out R1 as family friendly
implies that other areas are not and suggests that
parents in other, less-expensive neighborhoods are
somehow doing their children a disservice. The plan-
ning profession should abandon such condescension
and elitism.
A fourth defense of R1 involves some form of
“whataboutism.” Why focus on R1? What about funding
more subsidized housing? Abolishing parking require-
ments? Reducing minimum lot sizes? What about all
the other ways cities can exclude? These are legitimate
questions. But our argument, again, is not that ending
R1 solves every urban problem. We are no friends to
minimum lot sizes or parking requirements, and
America absolutely must fund subsidized housing more
generously. Acknowledging that these reforms are
necessary does not make ending R1 unnecessary.
Indeed, without ending R1, the efficacy of these other
reforms would be limited. Suppose the United States
dramatically expanded housing vouchers. Poor renters
would have more money but remain badly constrained
in where they could spend it because R1 would still
wall off large swathes of urban land. In this situation,
where poor renters have more spending power for
housing but not more housing choices, landlords can
simply raise prices and pocket the vouchers as profit
(Collinson & Ganong, 2018). Affordable housing policies
will be far more powerful when more land is open to
affordable housing development.4
It is true that R1 is not the only way cities can
exclude. It is, however, the easiest and most prevalent
way. Few weapons in the exclusionary arsenal rival a
blanket prohibition on all but the lowest density devel-
opment. The fact that cities can erect other barriers to
housing is no excuse for leaving the biggest barrier
intact. People sometimes commit violence with knives,
but that is not an argument against gun control.
A final argument, which we take more seriously, is
that ending R1 risks evicting tenants in single-family
homes. When R1 is upzoned, single-family landlords can
earn windfalls by selling to developers, but their renters
could be put on the street in the process. Although this
concern is valid, it is not a concern unique to upzoning
R1: it is a concern about upzoning, period. If the pres-
ence of renters makes upzoning R1 problematic, then it
must make upzoning multifamily neighborhoods even
more problematic because multifamily neighborhoods
have far more renters. By this logic, cities should not
upzone any neighborhoods at all.
Anyone concerned about housing affordability,
however, should favor upzoning, not oppose it. If cities
worry upzoning will harm renters, then cities should
upzone places where renters are least likely to live. This
means upzoning R1. Most people in detached single-
family homes are not renters, and most renters, espe-
cially low-income renters, are not in detached single-
family homes. The American Housing Survey shows that
in the metropolitan United States, only 10% of house-
holds in detached single-family homes are poor, com-
pared with close to 30% of households in multifamily
units. More than 60% of the poor households in single-
family homes, moreover, own their dwellings. In total,
only 4% of detached single-family homes in the United
States hold renters whose household incomes are
below $25,000 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2017).
These statistics do not mean, of course, that upzon-
ing R1 will never displace tenants. But they do suggest
the problem can be managed. Cities can and should
attach strong renter protections to upzoning: They can
require owners give tenants ample notice, generous
buyouts, and even rights of return. Provisions like these
will ensure that owners only benefit from their windfalls
if they do right by their renters.
Homeowners will still receive windfalls from the
upzoning, and this may seem unfair, but remember that
homeowners also receive windfalls from not upzoning.
When land is not upzoned, values rise because housing
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cannot be built. When land is upzoned, in contrast, val-
ues rises because housing can be built, and homeown-
ers can only access that value when they sell to
someone planning to build it. Accessing that value,
moreover, makes it liquid. When homeowners sell, their
windfall housing wealth becomes windfall income, and
taxing income is easier, politically and administratively,
than taxing wealth. If local governments pair upzoning
with a progressive tax on real estate transfers, they can
get more market-rate housing and more funding for
subsidized affordable housing. The question, then, is
not whether homeowners will receive windfalls. It is
whether those windfalls will come from maintaining
housing scarcity or enabling housing abundance.5
Conclusion: The Elephant in
Planning’s Room
The American way of zoning is unique. Many countries
privilege homeownership, and many households world-
wide live in single-family homes. The United States is
almost alone, however, in using regulation to promote
and protect neighborhoods of detached single-family
homes and to imply that life in these neighborhoods is
synonymous with good citizenship and responsible
family life (Hirt, 2014). This valorization of detached sin-
gle-family living embeds a long line of prejudice and
bias—against non-Whites, nontraditional families, the
poor, immigrants, and urbanity—into local zoning.
Planners have twin obligations to equity and efficiency,
and R1 fails on both counts. America’s inefficient alloca-
tion of urban land creates unequal opportunities and
unequal outcomes.
Zoning is important. By offering residents some
assurance about the future of their communities, it can
encourage people to invest both time and money in
the places they live (Fischel, 2002). That is undoubtedly
to the good. But certainty and stability are not sover-
eign virtues. Their benefits must be weighed against
their costs, and those costs include the burdens carried
by people who live outside strictly zoned areas. No one
has an inviolate right to steadily appreciating property
wealth, and reasonable certainty about the future is not
the same as perpetual protection from all threats, real
and imagined, that might come from new
development.
One could accept our argument and still question
its political feasibility. Perhaps we are just proposing a
series of losing battles with neighborhood associations.
We do not think so. Ending R1 will be difficult but not
impossible. R1 can end neighborhood by neighborhood,
city by city. Some cities might expand their use of zon-
ing, like form-based codes, that eschews strict use
restrictions. Others might permit more accessory
dwellings. In expensive regions, even incremental pro-
gress will help. But progress could also come faster.
Minneapolis’s (MN) 2019 General Plan includes a frame-
work for ending R1, and Oregon’s governor has pro-
posed similar legislation. The mayors of three large
California cities have said they are open to ending R1
(Dillon, 2019). Maybe these efforts in Minneapolis and
Oregon will sputter; maybe these mayors were being
insincere. At least some signs, however, point to change.
Even if we are wrong, and the politics are more
daunting than we think, that hardly constitutes license
for inaction. Planners should not stand down in the face
of a social harm, particularly a social harm that lies
clearly in their domain, simply because reform is
unpopular. Planners are public servants, but they can
serve the public by leading as well as following. Single-
family zoning is a status quo planners should work to
change. Planning’s past already has too many instances
where the profession stood on the sidelines, or on the
wrong side, during fights for progress. R1 is without
question planners’ responsibility. As others recognize
its consequences, planners should at least help, if not
lead, efforts to end it and to reverse the damage it
has done.
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NOTES
1. City of Los Angeles statistic computed from county assessor
data. Seattle estimates: Eliason (2018), Rosenberg (2018). C. J.
Gabbe provided assessor data to estimate San Jose.
2. An oft-forgotten aspect of Euclid is that it reversed a lower
court ruling that Euclid’s zoning was designed in part to keep
neighborhoods White and was therefore a violation of Buchanan
(Rothstein, 2017).
3. The 2017 American Community Survey shows that 72% of non-
Hispanic Whites are homeowners, compared with only 42%
of Blacks.
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4. Similarly, abolishing parking requirements but leaving R1 intact
would likely generate little new housing in suburban areas.
5. A related objection: Perhaps R1 owners are harmed by upzoning.
What if developers build apartments on either side of a detached
single-family home? Should cities compensate the homeowner if
the home’s value falls as a result? No. First, the homeowner can
presumably sell her property, just as her neighbors did. More to the
point: Simply asking that question demonstrates R1’s exalted
status. Cities rarely compensate people for the consequences of
their regulatory decisions. Cities do not compensate condo owners
when new buildings block their view or existing landlords when
new apartments are constructed and certainly not renters when
restrictive zoning causes rents to rise. So we see no substantive
basis on which to compensate a homeowner.
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